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Case No. 20150284-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of unlawful pos-
session of a controlled substance, both third degree felonies. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
The stop. While exiting the freeway on a four-lane ramp into Salt Lake 
City, Defendant properly signaled before moving from the second lane to 
the third lane. But immediately after entering the third lane, Defendant 
moved into the fourth lane. A Salt Lake City police officer who was follow-
ing Defendant stopped him for violating Utah Code section 41-6a-804, 
which requires motorists to signal "continuously for at least the last two 
seconds preceding the begitming of the movement," i.e., the lane change. 
Impounding the car. After making the stop, the officer learned that the 
car was not registered to Defendant and that Defendant's driver's license 
had been denied. Because Defendant did not have a valid driver's license, 
the officer decided to impound the car. After Defendant exited the car, the 
officer permitted him to make a telephone call for somebody to pick up the 
car. The officer also asked whether Defendant had any drugs or weapons. 
Defendant admitted to having a pair of brass knuckles. The officer seized 
the brass knuckles and arrested Defendant for possession of a dangerous 
weapon. Pursuant to department policy, the officer inventoried the car in 
preparation for its impound. That inventory uncovered a variety of illegal 
drugs and paraphernalia. After the officer had inventoried the car and just 
as it was being hooked up to the tow truck, the registered owner arrived to 
pick up his car. But because the car was well into the impound process, the 
officer refused to let the owner take possession at that point. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the officer have reasonable suspicion that Defendant violated 
Utah Code section 41-6a-804, requiring motorists to signal "continuously for 
at least the last two seconds preceding the beghming" of a change in lanes? 
2. Did the officer violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when 
he impounded the automobile Defendant was driving when stopped? 
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Standard of Review. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress al-
leging a Fourth Amendment violation is a mixed question of law and fact. 
The court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error; its legal conclu-
sions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of the legal 
standard to the facts. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ,Il7, 332 P.3d 937. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are repro-
duced in Addendum A: U.S. Const. amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804 
(West Supp. 2015). 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
While exiting Interstate 15 on the four-lane ramp to the 1300 South 
Street or 900 South Street exits in Salt Lake City, Officer Jeremy Crowther 
saw a vehicle in front of him - driven by Defendant-move from the second 
lane to the fourth, or far right, lane. R141-42 (R65-66:if2). Defendant proper-
ly signaled before moving from the second lane to the third lane, but then 
"in one continuous movement" Defendant "just went across all the traffic" 
1 Although the traffic stop at issue was in April 2013, the State cites 
section 41-6a-804 as amended in 2015. That amendment did not change the 
elements of the offense, but reduced the degree of the offense to an infrac-
tion. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(5) (West Supp. 2015). 
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into the fourth lane-" without leaving [his vehicle in the third lane for] the 
appropriate two second signal." R142,153 (R65-66:12). Officer Crowther ac-
tivated the emergency lights in his unmarked patrol car and Defendant 
pulled off to the side of the road after turning right (east) onto 900 South 
Street. R142-44,148 (R66:12). 
Officer Crowther approached Defendant, explained why he stopped 
him, and requested his driver's license and registration. R145,156. Defend-
ant produced the· car's registration, which was in someone else's name, and 
Defendant advised Officer Crowther that it was not his car. R146,154. De-
fendant did not have a driver's license in his possession. Rl 45-46. Officer 
Crowther asked if he had a valid license and Defendant told him that he 
did. R146. But when the officer requested Defendant's name and date of 
birth, and said that he was going to do a license check, Defendant admitted 
to Officer Crowther that his license might be suspended. Rl 46. 
Officer Crowther returned to his patrol car and ran a computer check 
on Defendant's driver's license, the vehicle registration, and Defendant's 
criminal background. R146-47. The driver's license check revealed that De-
fendant's license had in fact been denied. R146 (R66:13). The registration 
check showed that the vehicle he was driving was registered to someone 
other than Defendant. R146. And the criminal background check revealed 
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that Defendant was" a documented gang member" and drug user. R147,156. 
In fact, ·officer Crowther had himself arrested Defendant several months be-
fore the stop on an unrelated drug charge. R147 (R66:13). After gathering 
this information, Officer Crowther decided to impound the vehicle because 
Defendant did not have a valid driver's license. R147,158 (R66:14). 
Officer Crowther, together with a second officer who had arrived as 
backup, notified Defendant that his license had been denied and that they 
were going to impound the vehicle. R148-49. Upon being so advised, De-
fendant told Officer Crowther that the car belonged to his brother and asked 
if he could call him to come pick it up. R149,153-55 (R66:17). Officer 
Crowther permitted him·to do so, but only after he exited the car. R149,151. · 
Concerned for his safety based on Defendant's gang affiliation, Officer 
Crowther asked Defendant if he "had anything illegal, weapons or anything 
on his person." R149,156 (R66:15). Defendant admitted that he had a pair of 
brass knuckles in his pocket and consented to a search of his person. 
R149,157 (R66:,I5). Officer Crowther retrieved the brass knuckles and ar-
rested Defendant for carrying a concealed weapon. R149-50 (R66:i15). 
After placing Defendant in his pah·ol car, Officer Crowther invento-
ried the vehicle Defendant had been driving in preparation for impound. 
R150 (R66:'if6). Consistent with the department's impound policy, SE2 (Ad-
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dendum C), Officer Crowther documented the property found in the car us-
ing the department's impound forms. RlS0-51. The inventory uncovered 
methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana, and a glass pipe used to smoke nar-
cotics. R152 (R66:1q). The registered owner of the car-presumably Defend-
ant's brother- arrived to pick up the car after the inventory was completed, 
just as the vehicle was being hooked up to the tow truck. R151-52 (R66:if7). 
Because the car was already in the process of being towed, Officer Crowther 
proceeded with the impound. R152 (R66:if7). 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with (1) unlawful possession of methamphet-
amine, a second degree felony; (2) unlawful possession of heroin, a second 
degree felony; (3) unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon by a restrict-
ed person, a class A misdemeanor;-(4) unlawful possession of marijuana, a 
class A misdemeanor; and (5) unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor. Rl-3. Following a preliminary hearing and bindover 
order, R24-25, R106-37 (transcript), Defendant moved to suppress the evi-
dence seized from his person and from the car he was driving. R35-46. The 
State filed an opposing memorandum. R47-54. After holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion, R59-60,138-72, and entered corre-
sponding findings of fact and conclusions of law, R65-68. 
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Defendant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to possession 
of methamphetamine and heroin, both third degree felonies, reserving his 
right to appeal the court's ruling denying his motion to suppress. R85,87-93. 
Defendant was sentenced to suspended prison terms of zero to five years, 
placed on supervised probation for 24 months, and ordered to serve 180 
days in jail. R85-86. Defendant timely appealed. R75,84. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The justification for the stop. Defendant argues that the traffic stop 
was not justified at its inception because Utah Code section 41-6a-804 does 
not require that a driver signal for two seconds between each lane change. 
He is wrong. Section 41-6a-804, when properly read, requires a two-second 
signal before the beginning of a vehicle's movement, i.e., before a vehicle 
turns left or right or "change[ s] lanes." Accordingly, when the officer saw 
Defendant immediately change to the fourth lane after entering the third 
lane, he had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation that justified the stop. 
Even if this Court were to interpret section 41-6a-804 differently, reasonable 
suspicion still existed because the officer's interpretation would be a rea-
sonable mistake of law-no appellate court has addressed the issue and the 
Department of Public Safety has interpreted section 41-6a-804 in similar 
fashion. 
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II. The vehicle impound. Defendant argues that the vehicle impound 
was not justified under the Fourth Amendment, primarily because the of-
ficer did not permit him to make arrangements for the registered owner to 
retrieve the vehicle. Although the vehicle impound cannot be justified un-
der state law, it was reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant's driv-
er's license had been denied. He vy-as the only occupant of the car. And he 
was not the registered owner. Under these circumstances, impounding the 
car served the legitimate caretaking function of protecting ·the owner's 
property. Although Defendant was allowed to call the registered owner, the 
officer never knew whether or not arrangements had in fact been made. 
And he could not be certain that the person contacted was in fact the owner. 
Where Defendant was already under arrest, the officer was not required to 
wait in the hopes that the owner had been called and was on his way. 
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ARGUMENT 
. I. 
The officer had reasonable suspicion that Defendant's 
continuous movement across two lanes was a viola-
tion of Utah Code section 41-6a-804. 
In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that Utah Code section 
41-6a-804 requires only that a driver signal for two seconds before initiating 
a lane change, but may thereafter move into additional lanes without paus-
ing two seconds in each lane changed. See R37. The trial court rejected that 
argument and thus concluded that "Officer Crowther directly observed a 
traffic offense and consequently the stop was justified at its inception." 
R67:,I1. This Court should affirm. 
*** 
When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the vehicle occupants-
both driver and passengers alike - are seized within the n1eaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). A routine 
traffic stop "is a relatively brief encounter" and is thus akin to the investiga-
tory detention described in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Knowles v. Iowa, 
525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). Accordingly, police officers are justified in making 
a traffic stop only if they have" 'reasonable suspicion' -that is, 'a particular-
ized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped' of 
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breaking the law." Heien v. North Carolina,_ U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536 
(2014). 
The question in this case is whether Officer Crowther had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Defendant violated Utah Cod~ section 41-6a-804 
when he signaled for two seconds before changing from the second lane to 
the third, but then immediately moved into the fourth lane after entering 
the third lane. The answer is yes. 
When properly read, section 41-6a-804 requires that a motorist signal 
for two seconds before changing into a different lane. Thus, a motorist wish-
ing to move across multiple lanes must signal for two seconds before mov-
ing into each lane. Because Defendant moved into the fourth lane immedi-
ately after entering the third lane, the facts supported a reasonable suspicion 
that Defendant violated section 41-6a-804. But even if this Court were to in-
terpret section 41-6a-804 as only requiring a two-second signal for the first 
lane change, reasonable suspicion still supported the stop. This is so because 
the officer's reading of section 41-6a-804 as requiring a two-second signal 
before each lane change would be, in that case, a reasonable mistake of law. 
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A. Section 41-6a-804 requires that a driver signal for two 
seconds before moving into a different lane; Defend-
ant's failure to do so thus provided the officer with at 
least reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. 
Utah Code section 41-6a-804(1) imposes two requirements on drivers 
before turning or changing lanes: 
(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on 
a roadway or change lanes until: 
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety; 
and 
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided un-
der this section. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change 
lanes shall be given continuously for at least the last two sec-
onds preceding the beginning of the movement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1) (West Supp. 2015). The issue on appeal ad-
dresses the second requirement governing the use of signals. The question is 
whether section 41-6a-804(1) requires a two-second signal before each lane· 
change, or before only the first lane change when crossing over multiple· 
lanes. As correctly understood by both the trial court and Officer Crowther, 
the statute requires a two-second signal before each lane change. 
"'When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary 
goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the 
statute was meant to achieve."' Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transportation,_ 
P.3d __, 2016 UT 10, ,Ill (quoting Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 
110, 114, 993 P.2d 875). That is generally done by looking to" 'the plain Ian-
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guage of the statute itself'" -not in isolation, but in II the relevant context" 
of the entire statutory scheme. Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 118, 
193 P.3d 92). When so read, section 41-6a-804 requires a two-second signal 
before each lane change. 
A proper interpretation of section 41-6a-804 first requires an under-
standing of the vehicle movements it governs. There are two: (1) 11 turn[ing]" 
or II mov[ing] right or left on a roadway," and (2) 11 chang[ing] lanes." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(a). Thus, like the Texas traffic code at issue in 
United States v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2015)-upon which De-
fendant relies, Aplt.Brf. 17-20-the Utah Traffic Code recognizes "a distinc-
tion between the two" movements. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at 250. But un-
like the Texas statute under review in Alvarado-Zarza, section 41-6a-804 gov- . 
erns both movements. Accordingly, reference in the statute to II movement" 
refers to the movements of both 11turn[ing] right or left" and "chang[ing] 
lanes." Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-804(1)(b). The focus here is the movement of 
changing lanes. 
Section 41-6a-804 provides that a driver "may not ... change lanes 
until" two requirements are met: (1) "the movement," i.e., the lane change, 
can be made with reasonable safety," Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(a)(i); 
and (2) "[a] signal of intention ... to change lanes [has been] given continu-
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ously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the 
movement," i.e., the lane change, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-804(1)(a)(ii) & 
(b). By its plain language, therefore, the statute imposes a two-second signal 
requirement "preceding the beginning" of any lane change. The Utah Driv-
er Handbook also interprets section 41-6a-804 as requiring a signal u [ f] or 
two seconds before beginning any lane change." Utah Driver Handbook 
p.12 (rev. 06-14) (attached to Aplt.Brf., Add. E) (emphasis added). 
Here, Defendant did not make a single lane change; he made two 
such movements. After signaling for two seconds, he first changed from the 
second lane to the third lane. R141-42 (R65-66:if2). Defendant then changed 
lanes again. After entering the third lane, he immediately moved into the 
fourth lane. -R142,153 (R65-66:if2). Unlike the first lane change, Defendant 
did not signal "continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the 
beginning of [that] movement." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(b). When 
Officer Crowther observed Defendant's movement from the third to the 
fourth lane, he not only had reasonable suspicion, but probable cause that 
Defendant violated section 41-6a-804(1). See State v. Gettling, 2010 UT 17, ,rs, 
229 P.3d 647 ("Observing a vehicle commit a traffic violation gives police 
probable cause to detain the driver and passengers of the vehicle."). 
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The error in Defendant's interpretation of section 41-6a-804 is his fail-
ure to read the statute as a whole. Instead, he attempts to interpret the plain 
meaning of "movement" in isolation, without reference to the context in 
which the term is used. See Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,r11 (holding that Court 
will" 'not interpret the plain meaning of a statutory term in isolation'") (ci-
tation omitted). Defendant interprets "movement" as referring only to the 
movement away from the lane of travel. Thus, according to Defendant, a 
change of multiple lanes in one continuous movement-or in his words, a 
"lane change maneuver" -constitutes but a single movement. See Aplt.Brf. 
18,21 (arguing that Defendant complied with Utah's lane change law be-
cause he initiated a signal prior to starting his lane changes that consisted of 
'one continuous movement"'). But as discussed, that is not the way the 
statute reads. As relevant here, the term "movement" in section 41-6a-8O4 
refers to "chang[ing] lanes." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(b). Therefore, 
once Defendant entered the third lane, he was required to signal "continu-
ously for at least the last two seconds before the beginning of the [next] 
movement, i.e., before "chang[ing] lanes" again. Id. 
The foregoing plain language interpretation of section 41-6a-804 is al-
so consistent with "the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.'" See 
Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,111. Like all provisions in the Traffic Code, the pur-
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pose of section 41-6a-804 is to ensure highway safety. Indeed, the first re-
quirement before turning or changing lanes is that "the movement can be 
made with reasonable safety." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(a)(ii). The 
two-second signal requirement furthers that objective by alerting motorists 
in the vicinity that the vehicle will be moving into their lane. A two-second 
signal ensures that motorists in that lane, or that motorists who are also 
about to enter that lane, are aware of that pending movement and have time 
to act accordingly. Nearby motorists would have no such warning if drivers 
were permitted to cross multiple lanes immediately after the first lane 
change. 
In sum, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is consistent with 
both the plain language and purpose of the statute. Because Defendant did 
not signal continuously for two seconds before changing from the third lane 
to the fourth lane, Officer Crowther had at least reasonable suspicion that 
Defendant violated section 41-6a-804 and he was thus justified in making 
the traffic stop. 
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B. Even if section 41-6a-804 does not require that a driv-
er signal for two seconds before each lane change, the 
officer's believe otherwise is a reasonable mistake of 
law. 
Even if this Court were to interpret section 41-6a-804 as not imposing 
a two-second signal requirement before any lane change, Officer Crowther' s 
interpretation of the statute to read otherwise was a reasonable mistake of 
law." And because the mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable 
suspicion justifying the stop." Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 540. 
"[S]earches and seizures based on mistakes of fact [or law] can be rea-
sonable .... The limit is that 'the mistakes must be those of reasonable 
men."' Id. at 356 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
In other words, "[t]he Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, 
and those mistakes-whether of fact or of law-must be objectively reasona-
ble." Id. at 539. Should this Court interpret section 41-6a-804' s two-second 
signal requirement as applying only to the beginning of the first lane change 
in a multiple "lane change maneuver," Officer Crowther's contrary interpre-
tation was, in fact, an" objectively reasonable" mistake of law. 
As discussed, section 41-6a-804 is reasonably read as requiring a two-
second signal before making any turn or lane change. This was the interpre-
tation ot the trial court. See R67:ifl. And this is the interpretation of the offi-
cial Utah Driver Handbook published by the Department of Public Safety. 
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See Handbook, p.12 ("Signals are required ... [f]or two seconds before be-
ginning any lane change.") (emphasis added). Under these circumstances, a 
contrary holding by this Court could only be the result of an ambiguous 
statute. The officer's interpretation of the statute, therefore, was reasonable. 
Had this Court or the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the statute otherwise 
before now, the officer's alleged misunderstanding of the law would not 
have been reasonable. But Utah's appellate courts have not addressed this 
question. Accordingly, the officer's interpretation of section 41-6a-804, if 
mistaken, was reasonable. See Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at 250 ( observing that 
mistake of law in Heien was reasonable where "statute contained at least 
some ambiguity" and "the state's appellate courts had not previously ad-
dressed the issue"). Because Officer Crowther's mistake of law-if there 
were one-" was reasonable, there was reasonable suspicion justifying the 
stop" in any event. Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 540. 
II. 
The officer's decision to impound the vehicle Defend-
ant was driving did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
Defendant also argued below that Officer Crowther' s inventory of the 
car violated the Fourth Amend1nent because (1) impounding the car was 
unnecessary where the registered owner was present at the scene, (2) im-
pounding the car was not authorized by statute, and (3) impounding the car 
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was a pretext to search for drugs. R43-45. The trial court rejected these ar-
guments. It ruled that impound was reasonable where Defendant II did not 
have a valid driver's license," Defendant "was not the owner," and Defend-
ant "was the only occupant" of the vehicle. R67:,I2. The court also rejected 
Defendant's pretext claim because II Officer Crowther conducted the im-
pound [inventory] pursuant to his department impound policy." R67:if 4. 
This Court should affirm. 
*** 
As a general rule, a search requires a warrant based upon a finding of 
probable cause. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (holding 
that "[w]arrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable"). The warrant 
rule, however, is subject to "a few limited exceptions." Id. One such excep-
tion is the inventory of lawfully impounded property, such as an automo-
bile. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The inventory of an 
automobile serves three purposes: (1) "protecting the owner's property," 
(2) protecting the police against "liability for lost or stolen property," and 
(3) "protecting the police and public from danger." State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264,267 (Utah 1985); accord Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. 
The inventory exception, therefore, is not grounded in the State's law 
enforcement interests. It is grounded in the State's " 'community caretaking 
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functions.'" Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 
433,441 (1973)). As such, "[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are 
not implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of probable 
cause .... " Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). An inventory is per-
missible under the Fourth Amendment if two requirements are met. First, 
police must have "reasonable and proper justification for [impounding] the 
vehicle." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268. And second, police must conduct the inven-
tory in substantial compliance with "' an establ~shed reasonable procedure 
for safeguarding impounded vehicles and their contents.' " Id. at 269 ( quot-
ing 2 Lafave, Search & Seizure§ 7.4, at 576-77 (1978)). The only issue on ap-
peal is the first requirement-whether Officer Crowther was justified in im-
pounding the car.2 
As explained in Hygh, impounding a car may be justified u either 
through explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances surround-· 
ing the initial stop." Id. In this case, no specific statutory authority exists au-
thorizing the impound of a vehicle whose driver does not have a valid op-
erator's license. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101 (West Supp. 2015). 
2 Defendant has never claimed that Officer Crowther did not conduct 
the inventory in conformance with the Salt Lake City Police Department's 
established impound policy. See R35-46; R160-67; Aplt.Brf. 22-37. 
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That said, the circumstances surrounding the stop justified the impound 
and resulting inventory. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268. 
As noted by the· trial court, Defendant did not have a valid driver's 
license; he was the only occupant of the vehicle; and he was not the vehi-
cle's owner. R67:12. Thus, whether or not he was under arrest when Officer 
Crowther decided to impound the car, Defendant could not lawfully drive it 
away from the scene, nor would.he be permitted to do so. Defendant was 
also physically incapable of driving the car away once he was arrested- . 
which preceded both the inventory and impound. See RlS0 (R66:if5). And 
finally, no one was with Defendant who could have driven the car away. See 
R145. Officer Crowther thus had two choices: he could leave the car there-
parked along the curb of 900 South Street, which sustains traffic from cars 
exiting the freeway-or he could impound the vehicle for the absent own-
er's safekeeping. Under these circumstances, the officer's choice to impound 
the car was justified under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Johnson, 745 
P.2d 452 (Utah 1987) (upholding impound where "neither [defendant] nor 
his friends could properly have moved the vehicle" from the motel parking 
lot). This is especially true where the registered owner was not present. See 
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267 (recognizing that impound serves the legitimate pur-
pose of "protecting the owner's property"). 
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Citing State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 508 (Minn. 2008), Defendant 
argues that impound was not justified because "Officer Crowther failed to 
allow for an alternative to impound when [he] made it clear that a viable 
and immediate one was available." Aplt.Brf. 30. But the Fourth Amendment 
does not require an officer to pursue alternatives to impoundment. As noted 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, the United States Supreme Court in 
Colorado v. Bertine "held that although the police could have offered the de-
fendant the opportunity to make other arrangements for· the safekeeping of 
his property, their failure to do so did not eliminate the justification for tak-
ing an inventory of the defendant's property." Johnson, 745 P.2d at 454. As 
Bertine explained, "the police may still wish to protect themselves 
... against false claims of theft or dangerous instrumentalities." 479 U.S. at 
373. " 'The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not 
necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative less intrusive 
means.'" Id. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)). It 
tu1ns instead on" 'whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps.' " Id. 
(quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647 (emphasis in original). Here it did not. 
Officer Crowther did in fact allow Defendant to make a telephone call 
for his brother to pick up the car. R151. But after Defendant made the call, 
Officer Crowther was never made aware of whether Defendant successfully 
-21-
made arrangements for the car's retrieval. See R154 (when asked whether he 
knew there was an owner willing to take possession of the car, the officer 
testified, "I didn't talk to him, sir, so I don't know"). He thus had no idea if 
-or when the registered owner would come. He only learned that when the 
owner arrived following the inventory. See R151 (testifying that Defendant 
"did make a phone call because someone actually showed up"). 
Additionally, as in Bertine, Defendant here had been arrested and 
placed in the patrol car before the vehicle was impounded. R150 (R66:·,r,rs-
6). Thus, as even Gauster recognized, it may be "necessary to do something 
with the vehicle" under such circumstances. 752 N.W.2d at 507 (emphasis in 
original). And Gauster agreed that it was not unreasonable for the Supreme 
Court in Bertine "to have concluded that in such a case, the police should 
not have to take time to determine how the arrestee_ wants to dispose of his 
vehicle." Id. This is especially true here. Although Defendant claimed that 
his brother owned the car, Officer Crowther had no way of knowing that 
was true at the time. And he had reason to doubt Defendant's representa-
tion- Defendant had initially lied that he had a valid driver's license, com-
ing clean only after learning that Officer Crowther intended to verify his li-
cense status. R146. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to proceed 
with the impound. 
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Defendant also argues that the impound was not justified because it 
violated the Salt Lake City Police Department's Impound Policy. Aplt.Brf. 
32-35. Relying on Tenth Circuit precedent, Defendant contends that to justi-
fy a vehicle impound, the police department's impound policy must ✓, delin-
eate the amount ·of discretion ·an officer has when deciding whether to im-
pound a vehicle" and the officer must comply with those procedures. 
Aplt.Brf. 32-33 (citing United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 
2015)). Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, whether a vehicle 
impound is justified under the Fourth Amendment does not turn on local 
police policies. And even if it did, Officer Crowther did not violate Salt Lake 
City's impound policy. 
The federal circuits are in fact split as to whether the validity of a ve-
hicle impound depends on the creation of, and compliance with, a police 
department's impound policy. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1247-48 (recognizing· 
"a clear divide between the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, which never 
consider whether an impoundment follows standardized procedures, and 
the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits," which do). This Court 
should follow the rationale of the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits. 
As·noted by the First Circuit, the Supreme Court in Bertine held that 
the vehicle impound in that case II was reasonable under the Fourth 
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Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to standard criteria_ and 
· was based on something other than the suspicion of criminal activity." Unit-
ed States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 238 (1st Cir. 2006). But the First Circuit un-
derstood Bertine to merely hold that an impound decision "made pursuant 
to standardized procedures will most likely, although not necessarily al-
ways, satisfy the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 238-39. This Court should read 
Bertine likewise. As the United States Supreme Court has more recently em-
phasized," 'whether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment' ... has never 'depend[ed] on the law of the particular 
State in which the search occurs.'" Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) · 
(quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). In light of this hold-
ing, it would be strange indeed to hold that _the reasonableness of an im-
pound depe;nded on local policy policies. 
The 11 'ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-
ness.'" Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,403 (2006)). And reasonableness in the inventory setting 
is grounded not in a police department's policy manuals, but in the legiti-
mate caretaking interests of "protecting the police and public from danger, 
avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting the own-
er's property." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267. The Utah Supreme Court has thus 
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held that in determining whether a vehicle impound was justified under the 
Fourth Amendment, courts "must look to the circumstances surrounding 
the stop to determine whether the impound was reasonable." Id. at 268. This 
Court is bound to follow suit. 
In any event, Officer Crowther followed department policy in exercis-
ing his discretion to impound the car. That policy permits officers to ....,im-
pound vehicles as a means of enforcing local and State Laws, removing a 
public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its 
contents until the owner can take possession of it." Impound Policy, p. 1 (Ad-
dendum C) (emphasis added). As explained above, the vehicle impound in 
this case was reasonable to "protect[] the vehicle and its contents.until the 
owner [could] take possession of it." Id. 
Defendant points to the policy's ensuing line: "To avoid needless ex-
pense and inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall use discretion 
in determining whether or not a vehicle should be impounded." Id. But this 
does not mean that an officer must always eschew hnpound if doing so will 
avoid expense and inconvenience. As explained, the car's owner was not 
present and Officer Crowther had no assurance he would arrive. It was thus 
reasonable for him to impound the car. And by the time the owner did ar-
rive, Officer Crowther had already conducted the inventory. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on April 20, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
Relevant Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
U.S. Const. amend. IV 
Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-804 (West Supp. 2015) 
U.S. Const. amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804 (West Supp. 2015) 
( 1 )(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or 
change lanes until: 
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety; and 
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this 
section. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be 
given continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning 
of the movement. 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle 
without first giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately 
to the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal. 
(3)(a) A stop or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand 
and arm or by signal lamps. 
(b) If hand and arm signals are used, a person operating a vehicle shall 
give the required hand and arm signals from the left side of the vehicle as 
follows: 
(i) left turn: hand and arm extended horizontally; 
(ii) right turn: hand and arm extended upward; and 
(iii) stop or decrease speed: hand and arm extended downward. 
(c)(i) A person operating a bicycle or device propelled by human power 
may give the required hand and arm signals for a right turn by extending the 
right hand and arm horizontally to the right. 
(ii) This Subsection (3 )( c) is an exception to the provision of 
Subsection (3)(b)(ii). 
( 4) A person required to make a signal under this section may not flash a 
signal: 
(a) on one side only on a disabled vehicle; 
(b) as a courtesy or "do pass" to operators of other vehicles approaching 
from the rear; or 
( c) on one side only of a parked vehicle. 
(5) A violation of this section is an infraction. 
ADDENDUMB 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R65-68) 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
BYRON F. BURMESTER, 6844 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDING OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 131904665 FS 
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant's Motion To Supress having been raised in Court in the above entitled matter 
on December 9, 2013. The Court considered memoranda submitted by the Defense and the State 
as well as testimony and evidence adduced at the motion hearing. The Defendant was 
represented by counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, and the State was represented by Deputy District 
Attorney, Byron F. Burmester. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
I. 
2. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Defendant, Romeo Lucero Olivarez was charged with three counts of possession 
of controlled substances, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person and possession of drug paraphernalia arising out of a traffic stop on 
April 30, 2013. 
On April 30, 2013 Officer Crowther observed a vehicle coming off the 900 South 
exit onto West Temple turn on its right turn signal but change multiple lanes 
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3. 
without pausing 2 seconds for each lane change. When the vehicle tu.med east 
on 900 South the officer made a traffic stop. 
After contactin~ the Defendant who was the lone occupant of the vehicle, Officer 
Crowther discovered the Defendant's drivers license was denied. Officer 
Crowther further realized that the Defendant was a known gang member and 
that he had arrested him recently on unrelated drug charges. 
4. Officer Crowther decided at that point he would impound the vehicle. He 
informed the Defendant and asked the Defendant to get out of the vehicle that 
was registered to someone else. 
5. Officer Crowther asked the Defendant if he had any weapons or contraband on 
him, to which the Defendant replied that he had brass knuckles. Officer 
Crowther seized the brass knuckles and then arrested the defendant. 
6. Pursuant to Salt Lake City Police Department policy Officer Crowther began an 
impound inventory of the vehicle. During the inventory officer Crowther found 
methamphetamine, heroin, and a pipe for ingesting controlled substances. 
7. At some point after the officer had informed the Defendant that he was going to 
impound the vehicle, the Defendant requested that he be permitted to call the 
owner to retrieve the vehicle. Someone arrived purporting to be the owner after 
the inventory was complete and the vehicle was being hooked up to the tow 
truck. The officer declined to turn the vehicle over and completed the impound 
process. 
8. The defendant filed a motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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1. Officer Crowther directly observed a traffic offense and consequently the stop 
was justified at its inception. Further, the officer's questioning of the defendant 
did not exceed the scope of the purpose of the stop. 
2. Once the vehicle stopped the officer determined that the driver did not have a 
3. 
4. 
5. 
valid license; that he was the only occupant; and that the driver was not the 
owner. Thus the officer's decision to impound the vehicle did not exceed the 
scope of the purpose of the stop. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defudant's criminal 
history, gang affiliation, and admission of possessing a dangerous weapon, the 
officer had a reasonable belief in his concern for his safety. 
Officer Crowther conducted the impound pursuant to his department impound 
policy. 
Therefore the State has satisfied its burden that the seizure and subsequent 
impound were reasonable and the evidence obtained is the not the fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
6. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion is denied. 
DA TED this IO th day of~ 201!J_. 
. .---:~---- ""-· 
... -· .... 
.I. 
: • •· ·r" 
. " . 
. ' ... 
---· 
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READ AND APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
~/ 
Counsel for Romeo Lucero Olivarez . 
e ... ,Q 
00068 
ADDENDUMC 
Salt Lake City Police Department Impound Policy 
(State's Exhibit 2) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
111-400 IMPOUNDS, VEHICLE HOLDS AND 
RELOCATIONS 
Officers of this Department may impound vehicles as 
a means of enforcing local and State Laws, removing 
a public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or 
protecting the vehicle and its contents until the owner 
can take possession of it. To avoid needless expense 
and inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall 
use discretion in determining whether or not a vehicle 
should be impounded. 
All impounds will be documented in the RMS and on 
a Salt Lake City Police Department Impound Report. 
The impounding otliccr will provide the tow driver 
the white and pink copies and submit the yellow copy 
10 Records. 
State Impounds will be documented on the TC-
540/Utah State Tax Commission Vehicle Impound 
Report The impounding officer will provide the tow 
driver the yellow copy and submit the white and 
goldenrod copies to Records, who will forward the 
form to the Impound Coordinator in Auto Thell The 
Impound Coordinator will send the Impound forms 
by mail lo the Motor Vehicle Division. The pink 
copy has vehicle release information on the reverse 
side and will be left with the driver. The Division of 
Motor Vehicles must be notified within 48 hours of 
impound. 
An impound report form will be completed for every 
vehicle impounded for any reason. 
Notice of lmpoundment 
SLCPD will provide the vehicle owner a Notice of 
lmpoundment and Right to Impound Hearing form 
within 48 hours of a city impoundment. This form 
should not be used with State tax impounds. 
The officer will fill in the name of the vehicle owner 
or driver from the information obtained by valid 
identification, if available The most current address 
shoLild be obtained. 
The officer will date and sign the form and deliver 
the original lo the vehicle owner or driver at the time 
of impound. The copy ufthc Notice oflmpoundment 
and Right to Impound Hearing form should be turned 
into Records who will forward it to the Impound 
Coordinator in Auto Thell. The Impound 
Coordinator will send notification by certified mai l to 
the registered owner and lien holder within 5 working 
days of irnpoundment whether or not the vehicle is 
being held for evidence. 
The initial officer should deliver the original copy of 
the Notice of lmpoundment form to the vehicle's 
registered owner or driver during the course of the 
investigation. If the vehicle's owner or driver has left 
the scene prior to impound, the original should be (ell 
in a visible and safe place in the vehicle's driver 
compartment. The officer should write "Unavailable 
to Sign" in the "Del iver To" area. The copy should 
then be forwarded as above. 
State Impounds for Expired Registration 
The following procedure will govern the impounding 
of vehicles for expired registration only situations. 
Occupied Vehicles: In cases where a vehicle 
displaying expired registration is accompanied by the 
owner or a responsible party or if the owner can be 
contacted, and that person verifies the registration is 
in fact expired, the following nppl ics: 
• If the expiration date is less than 90 days, do not 
impound. 
If the expiration date is 90 days or more and 
verification can be obtained as stated above, a 
Stale Impound may be in order. Officers may 
exercise discretion on the side of not impounding 
as the facts ofU1e situation dictate. 
Revoked Registration: For various reasons the 
OMV can revoke Lhe registration of a vehicles. 
When the registration ha~ been revoked, the vehicle 
can be impounded, holding for tl1c vehicle for State 
Tax. 
Unoccupied Vehicles: Unoccupied vehicles will not 
be impounded for expired registration relying solely 
upon the information provided from the State 
Computer System. This policy docs not preclude the 
enforcement of any City Ordinances npplicablc, 
including abandoned vehicles or streets for storage. 
"No lnsurnnce": vehicles will not be impounded for 
the reason of'"No Insurance," "No Insurance" can be 
added to the citation as a secondary to the primary 
reason for impound. 
Authority of Parking Enforcement Personnel 
Parking enforcement personnel arc authorized to 
impound vehicles that arc parked in violation of City 
Ordinances and State Laws. Upon request, an officer 
of this Department will respond and provide 
assistance as needed. Appropriate reports and 
documentation will be entered into the RMS by 
Parking Enforcement and maintained hy this 
Departmenl 
J mpound Fee Waiver 
If fees are to be waived, the follow-up Detective will 
go to the Service Desk, obtain the waiver f~rm a~d 
fill it out completely. The follow-up detective will 
have the Division/Unit Commander, Assistant 
Division/Unit Commander or Watch Commander 
approve and initial the form. The follow-up detective 
will call the Hearing Office at 801-535-6321 and 
notify them that a fax is enroute. The follow-up 
detective will then fax the fonn lo the Hearing Office 
at 801-535-6082. 
The Hearing Officer will review the form and will 
either give approval or denial then fax the fonn back 
to the Police Department at the number provided by 
the follow-up detective. The follow-up detective will 
then return the form to the Service Desk. The citizen 
will be given a copy to take to the impound lot for 
release of the vehicle. If the recommendation is to 
deny the fee waiver, the person requesting the waiver 
should be referred to the Hearing Officer. 
Wrecker Use 
The officer must detennine the appropriate type of 
impound, City or State and fill out the appropriate 
impound form. Only those towing companies 
specified by contractual agreement with the City will 
be used to tow impounded vehicles on non-state 
impounds. There is only one City Impound lot. 
There are several State-impound lots used to store 
impounded vehicles. The reporting officer m~st !ist 
the Towing Company, phone number and destination 
in the Vehicle Field on the Impound Report form and 
is to be included in the Scizcdffowed details page of 
the RMS. 
Holds on Impounded Vehicles 
At the time of impound, the officer must notify 
Dispatch of any holds on the impounded vehicle. 
Holds will be documented in the Seized/Towed 
details page. Police personnel will refer to this 
information when a vehicle owner or the owner's 
representative inquires about release of the vehicle. 
• Hold for Owner: The vehicle may be released to 
the owner or the owner's representative. 
Hold for State: Release of the vehicle must be 
obtained through the State Division of Motor 
Vehicles. 
Hold: Recovered Stolen: Is either a hold for 
Detectives or hold for Owner. 
Hold for Evidence: The vehicle can only be 
released upon authorization of the investigating 
division or the District Attorney's Oflice. 
If a car is impounded as a recovered stolen vehicle, 
the car shall be removed to the City Impound Lot and 
"Hold for Owner". Should the vehicle be improperly 
registered, evidence in another case, ownership in 
dispute, etc., a hold should be placed for the follow-
up squad. (Any vehicle which would have been 
released to the owner at the scene can be "Hold for 
Owner", when impounded. When a vehicle is 
impoundc..-d with a hold for evidence, the hold will 
expire seven days from the date of impoundment. 
The Impound Coordinator will send the follow-up 
Detective an Impound request for approval to release. 
If circumstances require the hold to be extended past 
the seven-day period, follow-up investigators must 
submit the written request through their 
Division/Unit Commander advising the Impound 
Coordinator of the extension. The Impound 
Coordinator will update the computer entry on the 
Seized/rowed details pages indicating the extension 
of the hold. After the extended day has expired, the 
Impound Coordinator will send a second request for 
approval to relea'>e. The follow-up Detective will 
remove the extended hold as soon as possible. 
Vehicle Inventory 
A thorough inventory search will be made of all 
vehicles being impounded A thorough inventory 
search will include: 
• The interior of the vehicle, including under the 
seats, the glove box, etc. 
• Under the hood. 
• The trunk, when possible. 
o All closed containers, i.e, sacks, hags, boxes, 
etc. 
The officer will remove all valuables from the 
vehicle and place them in evidence for safekeeping. 
Closed or locked briefcases, luggage, etc., will be 
opened before being placed in evidence. Such items 
will be opened in the presence of a supervisor if the 
locks must be forced or other damage done in order 
to open them. It is recommended the vehicle's owner 
or the driver be present. 
All items not considered valuables, such as spare 
tires, old clothing, etc .• will be locked in the vehicle's 
trunk, if possible. 
The officer will include the following in the property 
report: 
o Valuables placed into evidence. 
• Valuable items left in the vehicle because of the 
difficulty of transporting them to evidence (large 
machinery, etc.) will be listed in the report's 
details. 
• If no valuables are found in the vehicle, the 
officer will note that information in the report's 
narrative. 
Releasing Vehicles to Incompetent Drivers 
If a vehicle owner requests release of an impounded 
vehicle and appears lo be intoxicated or othc.-wisc 
incapable of operating the vehicle safely, 
Service/Impound Desk personnel may request that an 
officer be dispatched to the desk. The assigned 
officer will evaluate the owner's condition and take 
appropriate action. 
If the owner proves to be intoxicated or unable to 
operate a vehicle safely, the vehicle will not be 
released. If the owner is incapacitated, but requests 
that the vehicle be released to another person, and the 
officer is satislied that the other person could legally 
operate the vehicle, the officer may authorize release 
of the vehicle. 
Access to the City Impound Lot 
No one will be allowed access to the impound lot 
without complying with procedures outlined in this 
policy. Impound lots under State control are not 
governed by this policy. 
Authorized Access 
Access lo impounded vehicles stored in the City 
impound lot is limited to: 
• Salt Lake City police officers, officers of the 
DEA Metro, and officers from outside agencies 
including Motor Vehicle Enforcement 
Investigator. 
• The vehicle owner or the owner's representative. 
• The vehicle owner is verified by the State 
Vehicle Registration which has been attached to 
the case by the first individual to run the 
registration. 
• The owner's representative must have a 
notarized letter from the registered owner. 
Verification of release will be by verifying with 
State issued driver's license, State issued ID or 
passport against the registration or notarized 
letter. 
• All fees need to be paid prior to releasing any 
vehicle. 
• Insurance Adjusters: The Insurance Adjuster's 
identification will be verified by State issued 
driver's license, State issued lD or passport 
along with a business card from the insurance 
company with their name on the card. If the 
Insurance Adjuster is requesting release of the 
vehicle all lees need to be paid. 
• Any other person authorized by court order: A 
court order will be verified by State issued 
driver's license, State issued ID or passport. If 
the court order states that fees are to be paid they 
need to be paid prior to releasing. If the court 
order indicates that the individual is not 
responsible for the fees, a waiver needs to be 
initiated by the follow-up Detective, 
• Leasing Companies: The representative of the 
leasing company must submit a letter on 
Company letter head verifying that he/she is on 
employee of that leasing company and is 
authorized to obtain the release for that vehicle. 
All fees arc required to be paid prior to releasing 
the vehicle. 
o Dealers: The dealer must show evidence of 
ownership along with proof that they represent 
that dealership. The dealer must also present the 
dealer plate to the Impound Yard when 
transporting the vehicle from the Impound lot to 
the dealership unless towed or transported on a 
flatbed. All appropriate fees must be paid prior 
to giving a release. 
o Registered Lien holders or their representatives: 
The lien holder must provide a copy of the title 
that shows the lien and proves that the lien 
release section has not been signed. State issued 
driver's license, State ID or a passport is required 
to verify identification. If a release is to be given 
to the representative, they need to have a letter 
on company letterhead with the individual's 
name listed in the letter authorizing them to take 
possession of the vehicle. 
o Towing Companies: lfthc insurance company is 
releasing to a tow company, a copy of the work 
order with the insurance company's information 
and name of the individual picking up the 
vehicle, along with the individual's driver's 
license, State ID or passport must be submilled 
at the time of request. 
• If an individual is authorizing n tow company to 
take possession of their vehicle, a notarized leuer 
stating the tow company's name needs to be 
submitted at the time of request to release the 
vehicle, along with the tow company's driver's-
driver's license, State Id, or passport. All 
applicable fees need to be paid at the time of 
release. 
• Company or Trust owned Vehicles: The 
individual requesting the release of the vehicle 
must submit a legal document with the company 
name or trust name and individual's name on the 
document showing that they urc connected to the 
company or Trust and have the right to have the 
vehicle released to them. Driver's license, State 
Id or passpon will also be required for 
identification. All fees have lo be paid prior to 
releasing. 
Note: Insurance agents muy only inspect vel,icles, 
not remove property from then1. 
An Impound Lot Inspection and Property Release 
fonn must be presented lo the impound lot personnel 
to gain access to a vehicle stored in the lot. 
Issuing Impound Lot Inspection and Property 
Release Forms 
o A separate Impound Lot Inspection and Property 
Release limn must be issued for each vehicle, 
each time it is inspected or searched. 
(Exception: The Auto Theft Sergeant may use 
one form Lo gain access to the lot for the purpose 
of verifying vehicle identification numbers on 
several cars.) 
o Vehicles with Holds: Detectives from this 
Department or DEA Metro, may authorize the 
release of itemized property using the Impound 
Lot Inspection and Property Release Forms. 
• Vehicles without I folds: SLCPD Officers, 
officers from outside agencies, vehicle owners 
and any other person authorized by this policy 
may obtain authori7.ation forms via the Service 
Desk or the Impound Coordinator. 
• Before issuing a form, any Hold on the vehicle 
must be cleared through the follow-up officer or 
the follow-up officer's supervisor. Officers from 
this Department or DEA Metro should give 
vehicle ov.ners, officers, agents or other 
representatives specific instruction for clearing 
Holds. 
• After hours, emergency property releases may be 
authorized by the on-duly Watch Commander. 
• Property which may be authorized for release 
shall be limited to the personal property 
contained within the vehicle, but not attached to 
the vehicle or considered to be part of the 
vehicle's equipment (i.e. stereos, wheels, etc.). 
Impound Lot Personnel 
• Only persons with a valid Impound Lot 
Inspection and Property Release fonn will be 
given access to impounded vehicles. 
• The impound lot auendant should, whenever 
possible, accompany the requesting party during 
inspection of the vehicle. 
• Property removed from a vehicle must be 
verified against the Impound Lot Inspection and 
Property Release form. The vehicle owner or 
representative may only retrieve items itemized 
on the release form unless the release is for 
personal property and the Impound Lot 
personnel will list the items removed on the 
fom1. The Impound lot person will have the 
person receiving the property verify the accuracy 
of the property list. 
• Officers removing additional property must 
itemize the property and its disposition on the 
fonn. 
• The impound lot attendant will retain the original 
copy of the form and return the yellow copy to 
the Impound Coordinator. The Impound 
Coordinator will attach the yellow copy to the 
case to be filed for 3 years. 
Officers Removing Property: Officers removing 
property for evidence must observe accepted search 
and seizure practices. Any evidence removed must 
be described in additional narrative and 
pmpcrty/cvidence entry. 
Vehicle Relocations 
Relocations are a courtesy to the vehicle owner. 
Illegally parked vehicles should be dealt with 
according to State law or City ordinance and 
Department policy regarding impounds. In some 
circumstances, it may be appropriate for an officer lo 
have a legally parked, unattended vehicle relocated to 
another parking place. 
Officers may arrange for the relocation of vehicles at 
the request of other City departments. 'Officers will 
explain to those representatives from other City 
departments that the relocation will be at the expense 
of that department. Vehicles will be relocated to the 
nearest legal parking place as the situation dictates. 
Only those towing companies specified by 
contractual agreement with the City will be used to 
relocate vehicles. 
Officers will notify Dispatch of the description, 
license plate and the location of the relocated vehicle 
and the reason for relocating the vehicle. This 
infonnation will be documented in the RMS. 
